

"An extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of Plekhanov, the history of the international socialist movement, the Russian Revolution, and Russian social history.

As a study of Plekhanov, I do not hesitate to call it definitive."


—BERTRAM D. WOLFE




PLEKHANOV

THE FATHER OF RUSSIAN MARXISM

by Samuel H. Baron



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THE EMANCIPATION OF LABOR GROUP

PLEKHANOV'S CONVERSION to Marxism had no immediate organizational consequences. It was not until the latter part of 1883 that he and a few friends established the *Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda* (Emancipation of Labor Group), the first genuinely Marxian organization in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement. Equally surprising at first glance are the organizational activities of Plekhanov and his comrades in the two preceding years, indicated in a note appended to the September 1883 announcement of the creation of *Osvobozhdenie Truda*:

In view of the constantly repeated rumors of a union of the old group *Chernyi Peredel* with *Narodnaia Volia*, we consider it necessary to say a few words in that regard here. In the last two years, negotiations were in fact conducted between the two groups regarding union. But although two or three of our group even fully adhered to *Narodnaia Volia*, it was not possible, unfortunately, to effect a complete merger.¹

Plekhanov not only refrained for a significant interval from launching a Marxian organization but even came close to a rapprochement with the terrorists whom he had berated so severely! How can this apparently inconsistent behavior be accounted for? And what brought on the collapse of the reunion efforts, and the subsequent renewal and intensification of Plekhanov's assault upon *Narodnaia Volia*—this time under the aegis of the Emancipation of Labor Group?

When *Zemlia i Volia* split into two, a possible future alignment was not absolutely excluded. To be sure, substantial differences in program and principle existed. Yet sympathetic relationships between members in each faction had made it possible to divide the organization amicably and, thereafter, to maintain cordial and helpful contact. The absence of unrestrained attacks upon the terrorists in the pages of *Chernyi peredel* gave

evidence of a desire not to become embroiled in polemics that might deepen divisions and make difficult or impossible a future reconciliation. Of course, reconciliation would be unthinkable unless and until ideological differences might be composed or at least narrowed. But it was not beyond the range of possibility that they might be narrowed or composed, as the revolutionists gained new experience and new insight.

Plekhanov's hopes for *Chernyi Peredel*, following the breakup of *Zemlia i Volia*, proved illusory. In contrast to the dwindling Narodnik movement, the boldness and spirit of self-sacrifice displayed by the *Narodovoltsi* won enormous prestige for their organization. Radically inclined students were swept away by their dashing heroism and their courage; liberal-thinking professional men and workers who favored political liberty contributed moral support, money, and some recruits to the terrorist organization. The distinguished Mikhailovsky secretly collaborated with it. And, in Western Europe, Marx presently expressed unrestrained admiration for the *Narodovoltsi*, calling Russia "the leading detachment of the revolutionary movement in Europe," and the Tsar "the military prisoner of the revolution."² Although it gave him little satisfaction, Plekhanov's prophecy that terrorism would swallow up all the substance of the revolutionary movement appeared well on the way to fulfillment.

The distinct possibility existed that *Chernyi Peredel* itself might be swallowed up. At the time they left Russia with Plekhanov, Deutsch and Zasluch were at least half convinced that the terrorists and not the *Peredeltsi* were pointing the way for the Russian movement.³ Even Plekhanov himself could hardly remain blind to the merits of the terrorists. Whatever their theoretical inadequacies from his point of view, they were incontrovertibly the only force fighting vigorously and bravely against Russian despotism.

Plekhanov's opposition to terrorism at Voronezh and before had been largely a result of his conviction that political goals were alien to popular needs and incompatible with socialism. But one who, after nine months in the West, wrote that he knew "the value of political liberty" and greeted "every struggle for the rights of man" could hardly reject the efforts of the *Narodovoltsi* to attain them. Slowly, Plekhanov became aware that perhaps they and not he had been right at Voronezh; and with such an awareness an important difference between the groups faded.* On the other

* *Sochineniia*, XIII, 26. A year or two later, Plekhanov explained the historic role of *Narodnaia Volia* by reference to Hegel's famous dictum: "The owl of Minerva begins to fly only at twilight." The terrorists did not fully comprehend the significance of the activity they had inaugurated. Although they erred in regarding political assassination as an appropriate strategy for successful revolution, nevertheless they had materially advanced the prospects of the revolutionary movement by pushing political struggle to the fore. *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, I, 141.

hand, some of the Peredeltsi mistakenly believed that the Narodovoltsi, tacitly acknowledging that *they* had been in error, were once again giving proper attention to agitation among workers and peasants.⁴ Developments such as these seemed to have narrowed the difference between the two factions sufficiently to give some promise of an alliance. In January 1881 Plekhanov put out a feeler for union of the two factions on the basis of his as yet imperfectly formulated reconciliation and integration of political struggle with socialist activity among the masses.⁵ A few months later, Axelrod publicly stated that the two organizations might soon merge.⁶

While such possibilities were being bandied about, the émigré revolutionists heard the electrifying news of Alexander II's assassination. After three unsuccessful attempts, the "Tsar-Liberator" had finally been destroyed by the Narodovoltsi. Opponents of the regime joined in celebrating this "triumph," their joy tempered only by an awareness of what lay in store for the arrested conspirators. Few understood that at the very moment of its greatest success Narodnaia Volia proved its impotence. Behind it stood no force to follow up the initial blow with a decisive assault upon the state. The terrorists who remained at liberty had to content themselves with a letter to the heir to the throne, offering to discontinue their activities in return for certain political reforms.⁷ Would an irresistible movement have come as a suppliant asking the Tsar to enact reforms? The letter of the Narodovoltsi was an act of weakness, an acknowledgment that they could disorganize the government but not overthrow it. Fully cognizant of his power and their impotence, Alexander III discarded existing plans for a mild reform and embarked upon a reign notable for its unrelieved reactionary character.

Among the émigré revolutionists the prestige of terrorism now rose to flood tide, threatening to carry away Deutsch, Zasulich, and other Peredeltsi who were already favorably disposed to it. Writing from Geneva on behalf of Zasulich, Stefanovich, and himself, Deutsch declared to Plekhanov in Paris that this was a "grandiose event" and an occasion for joy.⁸ He and his friends, he said, anticipating the grant of a constitution in the near future, were anxious to return to Russia and make some contribution to the continuing struggle. Plekhanov replied that he saw no reason to leave Western Europe just then, and he tried to dissuade his friends. Stefanovich traveled to Paris to discuss the situation with Plekhanov, and came away disappointed: far from burning to get into battle, Plekhanov was wholly absorbed in the study of Marxism.⁹

The event that fired so many others left him cold. His reaction sprang from his well-known conviction of the need of a mass force for a successful revolution. While his friends appeared to be losing sight of that consideration, Plekhanov's awareness of it had been reinforced by his studies of

Marxism.* These convinced him of the folly of the methods, if not the goals, of the terrorists. In the absence of a *class* capable of placing limits on the power of the Tsar, the heroic sacrifices of the revolutionists must be wasted. "Yet another Alexander will they kill," he said, "another two or three generals, and with that they will cease to exist."¹⁰ Although he was still uncertain about Russia's future course or the proper tasks for the socialists, he was convinced that the terrorists were on the wrong track.

Plekhanov's position on the question of organization, although it gained in clarity in the year following the assassination of the Tsar in March 1881, remained consistent throughout. He still disapproved the total commitment of the revolutionary forces to political terrorism, but he desired the unification of the revolutionary movement. His friends, he feared, were ready to capitulate unconditionally to the Narodovoltsi. Stefanovich did in fact return to Russia in the summer of 1881 to join the terrorist organization, and only a lack of funds kept Deutsch from accompanying him. Stefanovich wrote Deutsch a stream of letters fervent in praise of the Narodovoltsi, their struggles and prospects. Deutsch responded by assuming for them among the émigrés the role of partisan and aide, seeking to gain them not only favor but financial and other material support. Zasulich, who was Deutsch's common-law wife, shared his views. That Axelrod, who was off by himself in Zurich, tended in the same direction is evident from the appreciative remarks he made about the terrorist organization in a speech to the congress of the German Social Democrats in the spring of 1881.¹¹

In the following months, as Plekhanov moved further toward an unqualified Marxian stand, with its attendant Social Democratic political implications, his outlook and that of his friends sharply diverged, a fact forcefully brought home to him when he returned from Paris to Geneva in the fall of 1881. He quarreled violently with Deutsch, and relations between them cooled abruptly. The state of mind of his friends in Geneva, he wrote to Lavrov, was expressed in the words "No matter how much we may bargain, let us unite with Narodnaia Volia at all costs."¹² Much as he wanted unification, he thought that it would do more harm than good if it were carried out on a faulty theoretical and programmatic basis. His policy in the next year and a half rested on the premise that the correction of the ideological line of the revolutionary movement took precedence over premature and indiscriminate merger plans.

A merger in late 1881, as he knew, would have meant the assimilation of the Peredeltsi into Narodnaia Volia, and the virtual loss of any leverage

* Deutsch tells us that Plekhanov had endeavored to draw Zasulich and him into the study of Marx. But such study as they had accomplished had not so far affected their basic outlook; see "Kak G. V. Plekhanov stal marksistom."

for switching the movement onto Marxian tracks. If there were to be any hope for Marxian influence, he must first of all bring about a closing of ranks with his colleagues. There could be no hard bargaining with the Narodovoltsi unless his own faction was reunited. Hence his efforts to persuade the others not to return to Russia for the time being; hence his ardor to educate them in Marxian thought. To that task he devoted no little attention in the winter of 1881-82 and thereafter. Nor did he confine his attention to the former Peredeltsi: having experienced a revelation, he burned to make it known. He urged all Russians whom he encountered in Geneva to apply themselves to the study of Marxism, and he also delivered a series of lectures on Marxism and its relevance to the Russian situation. The lectures were a great success, Deutsch says, but made no converts. It proved later to have been a costly mistake—though an unwitting one—not to have made some attempt to educate the Peredeltsi in Russia as well. Owing to their neglect of the ideological development of their comrades at home, those who presently established the first Marxian revolutionary group gratuitously forfeited support, and at the inception of their organization found themselves practically isolated from Russia.¹³

Plekhanov only gradually managed to regain his authority with his friends and to consolidate the group for organizational initiatives. With his return to Geneva, Deutsch and Zasulich were subjected to pulls from opposite directions. Stefanovich in Russia continued to send glowing accounts about the Narodovoltsi, and urged the émigrés to put themselves entirely at the disposal of the terrorist organization. Plekhanov exercised his influence against any such complete commitment, and stressed the necessity of devoting time to the mastery of Marxism. Actually a kind of double-gauge, compromise policy was adopted. Deutsch and Zasulich collaborated with Narodnaia Volia in matters of organizing press facilities and raising money. Through them Plekhanov himself was persuaded to contribute to its literary enterprise; specifically, and significantly, he undertook to provide material for leaflets for workers to be published in Russia.¹⁴ At the same time, Deutsch and Zasulich applied themselves to serious study and gradually came to adopt the Marxian point of view. Axelrod, in Zurich, where the headquarters of the harassed German Social Democrats were maintained and their newspaper published, was able to keep in touch with developments in the European socialist and labor movements, which he reported upon for a Russian liberal newspaper. Thanks to his extensive contacts with the Germans, he, too, was evolving toward a Social Democratic position. But, like the others, he felt gratitude to Narodnaia Volia for its valiant fight and for having awakened the revolutionary movement to the importance of the struggle for political liberty.¹⁵

In the course of 1882, negotiations for closer collaboration between the two groups and their ultimate amalgamation proceeded by fits and starts.

The situation mirrored the uncertain attitude of the former Peredeltsi to the terrorists. Although sympathetic to those engaged in an uncompromising struggle against the common foe, Plekhanov and his friends were progressively more critical of the Narodovoltsi ideological position. Beginning early in the year, events brought notice of a new and sharp divergence of views. In connection with the negotiations, Plekhanov's circle received in February a letter from the Narodovoltsi in Russia outlining their views in terms that created a sensation.¹⁶ Until then, the stated intentions of Narodnaia Volia had been the overthrow of Tsarism by a popular revolution, to be followed by the convocation of a constituent assembly; or, alternatively, the extortion of political rights from the Tsar. Now Tikhomirov, the writer of the letter, gave a radically different emphasis to the terrorist plans. "A state overturn," the first act of which, he explained, would be a seizure of power by the revolutionists, "is our to be or not to be. . . . To this goal we subordinate *all else*: program, tactics, all interests, all questions. This you must understand in the most profound way if you wish to be with us."¹⁷ The ideology of Tkachev had gained the upper hand in the councils of Narodnaia Volia.

The shift represented a belated response of the surviving terrorists to the fiasco of March 1, 1881. The assassination of the Tsar having changed nothing, the bankruptcy of the politics of assassination stood nakedly revealed. The Narodovoltsi had long since despaired of arousing the people to revolutionary action, and they clearly had no intention of reverting to agitation among the masses. Thus, for those who persisted in working for a revolution, there seemed no alternative to the direct seizure of power by a conspiratorial coup. Men like Tikhomirov, who were most sensitive to the questions and realities of power, drew the indicated conclusions and secured leadership of the organization.

Plekhanov was appalled by the new line, which he termed "unthinkable." More than ever he rebelled against joining forces with the Narodovoltsi, who, he declared, "do not possess an elementary understanding of contemporary socialism and the West European labor movement."¹⁸ Having pursued and acquired theoretical clarity by a study of Marxism, he found mystifying and repellent such passages of the letter as the following:

In order that we may act together as comrades, we must agree on the fundamental point of view and clarify it, which is the most difficult task. Here details and incidentals are not important, not that one is a socialist and the other a political radical, that one acts among the people and the other among the military. . . . All these are incidentals in which we may differ without ceasing to serve the same god. And the essential feature of the Narodovoltsi, which distinguishes them from all other revolutionary tendencies, is just that for the Narodovoltsi all these matters are incidental. From beginning to end Narodovism was a current of *immediate action, a state overturn*. . . . We are what we are, that is, neither radicals nor socialists, but simply Narodovoltsi.¹⁹

Perhaps because of his influence, Plekhanov's friends also felt misgivings about this letter from the Narodovoltsi. Nevertheless, they counseled conciliatoriness in the reply, in order not to wreck forever all chances of union. Plekhanov was of two minds. In the matter of theory, he reasoned, the Narodovoltsi were so ignorant and confused that it would be impossible to work with them in the same organization. But tactical considerations suggested the need for caution. If he insisted upon a clean break, as he had at Voronezh, he might find himself isolated once again. To avoid that, he was prepared, for the time being at least, to bow to the dictates of "party discipline." He knew that since his return to Geneva he had made headway in reshaping the views of his friends. Pending a complete meeting of minds, he felt it politic to give some ground to them. Accordingly, he consented to the diplomatic reply Deutsch wrote to the Narodovoltsi.²⁰ The latter responded favorably, holding the differences between the two inconsequential, and certainly no barrier to the joining of their efforts.

At this time Lavrov and such other well-known revolutionists as Kravchinsky and Kropotkin were associated with Plekhanov's group in the negotiations for unification. For the consolidated organization there was projected the publication abroad of a journal, to be called *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli* (Courier of the People's Will). Along with Kravchinsky and Lavrov, Plekhanov was invited to become an editor. In the spring of 1882, he expressed in a letter to Lavrov his hopes and fears concerning the journal and the prospects for amalgamation. Since Lavrov and Plekhanov's other friends desired it, he stood ready to become an editor; but he emphasized the conditional character of his compliance by drawing attention to the divide that separated the outlook of the Narodovoltsi from his own:

Our disagreements with the Narodovoltsi are already not so inconsequential as might appear from our letter to them. The letter was written more or less diplomatically for various reasons. You know my way of thinking, and I can assure you that it has not changed since I left Paris. If we put in the shade rather than emphasize our differences in the letter, that may be explained by the fact that we hoped and hope still to turn Narodovolism onto the right road. . . . In case of failure on our side, we shall have to go into opposition again: would that be fitting for me, as an editor of *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*?²¹ Furthermore, there exists between me and Serg. Mikh. [Kravchinsky], it seems to me, a significant difference in views: he is some sort of Proudhonist, I don't understand Proudhon; our characters are not alike: he is a person who is extremely tolerant of every variety of socialist thought, I am ready to make of *Capital* a Procrustean bed for all the collaborators of *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*.²¹

Plekhanov would presently learn that Lavrov stood much closer to Kravchinsky than he did on the question of the tolerable limits of socialist diversity. His own preoccupation with doctrinal orthodoxy was to be salient feature of his political career.

In the ensuing months, Deutsch, Zasulich, and Axelrod came around to full support of Plekhanov's ideas and strategy. Whether or not union of the two groups could be effected thus was to depend ultimately upon whether the Narodovoltsi would agree to accommodate themselves to Plekhanov's Procrustean bed. For some time, the pertinent evidence was ambiguous. As long as it was, the factions continued in uneasy association.

In the summer of 1882 Tikhomirov left Russia for Switzerland after a new and devastating assault upon the terrorist organization. In the meantime, Kravchinsky had withdrawn as an editor of the forthcoming journal, and Tikhomirov was slated to replace him. Tikhomirov seemed as a result of the recent debacle somewhat disenchanted with the latest program of Narodnaia Volia, but the opinions he expressed in conversations with Plekhanov's group appeared at the same time to rule out the possibility of collaboration. He told Deutsch that Marx was a charlatan who did not himself believe the propositions he expounded.²² He told Axelrod that an illegal organization of several hundred dedicated revolutionists was of more significance than all the electoral successes of the German Social Democrats.²³ To Plekhanov he indicated his tolerance of the anti-Jewish pogroms in southern Russia in 1881, and his lack of interest in establishing contacts with the German socialists.²⁴ Finding Tikhomirov's views irreconcilable with his own Social Democratic ideas, Plekhanov suggested that the two could scarcely work together as co-editors. But Tikhomirov disarmed him, asserting that he himself really had nothing against Social Democracy; however, he argued, the Russian revolutionists were generally prejudiced against it, and it was therefore necessary to prepare them gradually for the acceptance of a Social Democratic program.²⁵ Plekhanov then quickly agreed to be an editor, on the understanding that he would be given free rein to "re-educate" the movement. Tikhomirov, it seemed, had fallen in completely with the aims of Plekhanov's group.

Tikhomirov's conduct at the time is difficult to fathom with assurance. He is said to have become disillusioned with the program of Narodnaia Volia after witnessing its many defeats and losses. Perhaps for that reason, and also because of his bland indifference to theory, he was willing to be conciliatory if something stood to be gained. Clearly, he neither understood Social Democracy nor sympathized with it. But he could nonetheless agree with the Social Democrats on some matters: he, too, took a dim view of the surviving Narodniks. Moreover, he was pleasantly surprised to discover that the Marxists were not quietists but, on the contrary, held the most extreme political views.²⁶ To one who valued revolutionary militancy more highly than any theoretical system, this was a consideration of great weight. Finally, and probably most important, Tikhomirov realized that his organization could be put on its feet again only with the assistance

of revolutionists of prestige and talent. Zasluch, Plekhanov, Axelrod—and Lavrov, who seemed to be aligned with them—were names to conjure with. If they could be drawn into the work of Narodnaia Volia, surely that would be worth some theoretical concessions.

So matters rested for about a year. For only in the summer of 1883 did the Narodovoltsi secure the money with which to launch the *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*. In the meantime Plekhanov had taken Tikhomirov at his word and, with Axelrod, was preparing a powerful lesson in Marxism for the first issue of the new journal. Axelrod contributed an article saturated with the Marxian spirit entitled "Socialism and the Petty Bourgeoisie." In a review of a book on the historian Shchapov, Plekhanov called for a critique of Narodnichestvo. And he proceeded to supply the critique himself in a long article, "Socialism and Political Struggle," which found in Social Democracy the means to overcome the defects of the existing revolutionary programs. As for Narodnaia Volia, he called it "the most revolutionary but also the most unprincipled" of all the opposition parties.²⁷ Tikhomirov boggled at this but nevertheless agreed to accept the article.

As the actual publication drew nearer, the factions began maneuvering for position and influence. Plekhanov tried to get the name of the journal changed to something less official-sounding. He felt uneasy about working under a masthead suggestive of a tradition and ideas strongly at variance with his own.²⁸ He also sought to impart a Social Democratic flavor to the announcement of the new journal,²⁹ in which was set forth the editors' conception of the tasks and goals of the revolutionary party.

It was not these matters, however, but the organizational question which proved the insurmountable barrier. In the spring of 1882 a verbal agreement had evidently been reached on the merger of the two groups. With publication imminent, Plekhanov's faction pressed for a formal announcement of the amalgamation, with an explanation of its basis. They were reluctant to work in the organization if they were not to be extended the rights and privileges of members. But now Tikhomirov reversed himself, maintaining that Narodnaia Volia's constitution forbade the admission of an entire organized group. The faction would have to dissolve, and its members then be voted on individually by the Narodovoltsi.

Plekhanov and his friends were outraged at this unexpected turn, for, as Plekhanov wrote Lavrov, they did not consider it possible "to be smashed into atoms in order to be assimilated to Narodnaia Volia."³⁰ As much as anything, they resented the raising of a constitutional issue when the terrorist organization had been reduced by successive government blows to little more than a handful of green youths. Must the veteran leaders, who had so much to contribute, submit to such a demeaning procedure for the sake of some absurd legal point? Moreover, some evidence

existed of an intention on the part of the Narodovoltsi to exclude at least one of the other faction.³¹ The former Peredeltsi absolutely refused these terms. Seeing that he might lose all, Tikhomirov subsequently sought to mollify the group by offering to intercede with his comrades in Russia on behalf of a satisfactory adjustment of the point at issue. However, since a good many months might pass before a decision could be reached, the offended faction was not in fact mollified. Its members showed their displeasure by partially withdrawing their cooperation.

The former Peredeltsi chafed at the situation in which they found themselves. They had hoped to exert a powerful influence in the organization, but now it appeared that their talents were simply to be exploited. They felt that they would be regarded by the public as Narodovoltsi while in fact they were not; that they would be working for the glory of an organization that refused to concede them a voice in its affairs. The prospect was so distasteful that they began to discuss the possibility of forming a new group,³² and then to act on the premise. Plekhanov began looking for funds with which to back an independent publication.³³ Deutsch tried to persuade Axelrod to withhold from the *Vestnik* the article he had promised, and Plekhanov hoped his long article would be refused, since it would make an effective vehicle with which to launch a Marxian movement.³⁴ To invite its rejection, Deutsch pointed out to Tikhomirov's wife the all but insulting remarks about Narodnaia Volia in the article.³⁵ The intrigue worked. Tikhomirov shortly declared that the article could not be published unless it was either altered or he was permitted to append a note to it. He would not consent to Plekhanov's getting the last word with another note, so that the final decision was to reject the article. Plekhanov thereupon resigned his editorial duties, with a promise to continue collaboration on some other basis.³⁶

Tikhomirov and his group, of course, were not blind to the efforts of the former Peredeltsi to precipitate a break. To be sure, he tended to overlook the effects of his own behavior, in alienating them and arousing their suspicion. His own *volte face* resulted from his gradual realization that he had gone too far in giving the other faction a free hand. The aggressiveness with which Plekhanov advanced the Marxian outlook in his articles for the new journal may have awakened him to the danger for the Narodovoltsi, and the pressure of his comrades in Russia was important. By letter, they pointed out that Plekhanov's group would add little or nothing to the fighting forces in Russia, or to the financial solidity of the organization, while threatening to secure ideological predominance.³⁷ There were good reasons for reserve toward the Social Democrats.

Both parties were obviously losing interest in the amalgamation for which they had been preparing for more than a year. Complete collapse

of the effort could be only a matter of time. It came in the following way. Deutsch failed to receive a letter his friend Stefanovich had sent him from Russia, and he suspected the Narodovoltsi of having intercepted it. The latter feigned ignorance of the letter but at last, under heavy pressure, delivered it. Tikhomirov maintained that the organization "had a right to take a letter of its member."³⁸ But Plekhanov declared that the revelation of the methods employed by the Narodovoltsi had taken from him "all respect, not for 'the party' but for the persons who represented it here."³⁹ Late in August Tikhomirov and Plekhanov had a stormy interview, and on September 12 the break was made complete with the announcement of the formation of the Gruppy Osvobozhdenie Truda and its publishing arm, the Library of Contemporary Socialism.

Thus ended the effort to join the two incompatible groups. The differences between them were too great to permit of a stable union. A conspiracy for the seizure of power by a revolutionary clique, after all, had rather little in common with the principles of Social Democracy as understood in the 1880's. Since the two tendencies could not live in connubial bliss, it was inevitable that each should try to assimilate the other. Failing that, there could be little interest in continued association. Each party could, with some justice, accuse the other of intrigue and bad faith. Both parties considered that the future of the revolutionary movement was at stake. And neither was willing to make an agreement except on condition of predominance of its own views.* The former Peredeltsi were attempting to capitalize on the popularity of the name Narodnaia Volia, while trying to infuse that name and organization with a Social Democratic content. Tikhomirov, it appears, intended to turn the well-known names and the experience and talents of the former Peredeltsi to the advantage of his organization, without, however, allowing them a predominant voice. The Narodovoltsi had determined not to accommodate themselves to Plekhanov's "Procrustean bed." The major consequence of the collapse of negotiations was the birth of Russia's first Marxian revolutionary organization.

* In all the cross-fire, Tikhomirov had been careful to impress upon Lavrov an image of himself as the apostle of unity and compromise, while he made his opponents out to be saboteurs and intriguers. In this tactic he succeeded, for Lavrov stayed on as an editor after the others withdrew from collaboration. An incidental result of the break, therefore, was the severance of the intimate ties between Plekhanov and Lavrov. The cardinal sin with which Lavrov reproached his former friend was that he had chosen to fight against other revolutionists rather than against the common enemy. See Lavrov, "Sotsializm i politicheskaja bor'ba," *Vestnik Narodnoi Voli*, No. 2 (1884), Part 2, p. 65.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 135.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
33. *Perepiska Marksa i Engel'sa*, pp. 240-41.
34. *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, I, 206-7.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, VIII, 210.
38. *Sochineniia*, XXIV, 178.
39. *Ibid.*, I, 150-51.
40. *Literaturnoe nasledie G. V. Plekhanova*, VIII, 211.
41. *Dela i dni*, No. 2 (1921), p. 91.

CHAPTER 6

1. *Sochineniia*, II, 22.
2. Cited by Axelrod in *Rabochii klass i revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii*, p. 60.
3. Deutsch, "Kak G. V. Plekhanov stal marksistom," p. 129.
4. See Axelrod's speech in Nevskii, ed., *Gruppa "Osvobozhdenie Truda" v period 1883-1894 gg.: Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik*, II, 67 (hereafter cited as *Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik*, II).
5. *Sochineniia*, I, 136.
6. *Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik*, II, 67.
7. The letter appears in *Byloe*, 1906, No. 3, pp. 33-37.
8. *Gruppa*, II, 219.
9. Deutsch, "Kak G. V. Plekhanov stal marksistom," pp. 138-39.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 138; *Gruppa*, IV, 134.
11. Akselrod, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe*, pp. 393-99.
12. *Dela i dni*, No. 2 (1921), p. 86.
13. Akselrod, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe*, pp. 387-88; Deutsch, "K vozni-koveniiu Gruppy 'Osvobozhdenie Truda,'" pp. 198-200.
14. Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovol'tsami," pp. 6-7.
15. Akselrod, *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe*, Chapter 16. For an indication of his swing toward Social Democratic ideas, see his article of 1881 reprinted in *Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik*, II, 73-85.
16. Deutsch, *Gruppa*, III, 143-51.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
18. Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovol'tsami," p. 17.
19. *Gruppa*, III, 144, 148.
20. Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovol'tsami," pp. 15-20.
21. *Dela i dni*, No. 2 (1921), pp. 90-91.
22. "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovol'tsami," p. 35.
23. *Perezhitoe i peredumannoe*, p. 425.
24. *Sochineniia*, XIII, 29-30.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
28. *Dela i dni*, No. 2 (1921), p. 93.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-95.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

31. Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovol'tsami," pp. 37-39.
32. *Gruppa*, I, 175.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 245-46, 253.
37. *Istoriko-revoliutsionnyi sbornik*, II, 402-3. Tikhomirov later argued in the same vein, when trying to persuade Lavrov that the loss of Plekhanov and his group would not be so important. *Gruppa*, I, 250.
38. Tikhomirov, *Vospominaniia L'va Tikhomirova*, pp. 156-57; Deutsch, "O sblizhenii i razryve s narodovol'tsami," pp. 48-51.
39. *Dela i dni*, No. 2 (1921), p. 98.

CHAPTER 7

1. *Brief History of Russia* (New York, 1933), I, 230.
2. *Sochineniia*, II, 28, 39.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
5. Lavrov, "Sotsializm i politicheskaia bor'ba," p. 65.
6. Tikhomirov, "Chego nam zhdai' ot revoliutsii," pp. 227-62.
7. *Sochineniia*, II, 102.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 158.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74, 133-34.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 148-52, 236.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 235, 290.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 268.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 231.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 236, 239.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 230.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 189-94.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 271.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 205-14.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 217, 226-27.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 263.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 34, 270.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 238.
32. For a more detailed discussion of this matter and that treated in the following paragraph, see my article, "Plekhanov on Russian Capitalism and the Peasant Commune," *American Slavic and East European Review*, XII (1953), 468-71.
33. *Sochineniia*, II, 244-45, 258.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
35. For further discussion of this point, see "Plekhanov on Russian Capitalism," pp. 472-73.
36. *Sochineniia*, II, 130.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
38. *Ibid.*, pp. 79, 290, 303.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 66, 79, 296.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 330, 290-92, 308-9.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 357; italics mine.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
48. *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 294.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 313.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 78, 79, 239, 402.

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